SPEECH IN THE WELFARE STATE

The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:
A Threat to Liberty
Charles Friedt

The first amendment normally has been the friend of left
We should remember too that during the
wing values ....
ACLU's early years the organization represented mainly draft
resisters and labor organizers, whom Roger Baldwin saw as,
and intended to be, the main beneficiaries of his work. So the
historical connections between left politics and free speech in
this country are obvious.'
INTRODUCTION

One would think there is nothing new to say about the First
Amendment. The principal lines of doctrine are clear. Government
may not suppress or regulate speech because it does not like its
content-unless it is obscene or demonstrably defamatory. If government regulates the time, place or manner of speech, it must regulate in a way that does not take sides between competing ideas.
And if a government regulation directed at other ends has the effect of restricting speech, that regulation too must be neutral.

t Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Richard
Fallon, Thomas Grey, Sanford Levinson, and Martha Minow for commenting on earlier
drafts, and to Mark Filip and Courtney Wilson for research assistance. This Article was
prepared for The Bill of Rights in the Welfare State: A Bicentennial Symposium, held at
The University of Chicago Law School on October 25-26, 1991.
J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:Legal Realist Approaches To The First
Amendment 1990 Duke L J 375, 383 (footnotes omitted).
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Wonderful intricacies arise in working out the details and boundary lines of these doctrines, but the main principles are clear.
Last summer I lectured on American civil liberties law to a
group of young lawyers from the former communist countries of
Eastern Europe. These doctrines were clear enough that these lawyers could grasp them readily. They resonated so strongly with
universal, liberal (that is liberty-loving) intuitions, that these
young men and women found the doctrines entirely natural. At
first they were a bit startled that our Supreme Court had declared
that we cannot punish those who burn our flag,2 but on reflection
they found it thrilling.
So it is with no pleasure that I note that in this country, in
classrooms and law reviews, the great liberal ideal of free expres.sion is under attack. Tyrants have always derided freedom of expression-inspired either by Hitler or Marx and their academic
apologists. But as Professor Balkin points out, it had been scholars
and activists on the left who worked for the development of First
Amendment law.3 Yet today the theoretical challenge to free
speech principles comes from scholars of the left.4 Since ideas have
consequences, and the ideas expressed today in the classrooms and
law reviews may tomorrow find their way into judicial opinions, I
sound the alarm: to identify and catalogue, to analyze, explain and
I hope exorcise this new intellectual attack on liberty. Here, as in a
number of other areas, "civic republicanism" is the banner under
which this assault on liberty gathers.
A recent article by Professor Owen Fiss of the Yale Law
School illustrates this threatening trend. Professor Fiss takes a
seemingly uncontroversial premise as his point of departure: The
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause was intended to assure the
widest possible debate about matters of concern to the community.' It is thus a principal engine of democratic or, if you will,
republican participation in government. The error Fiss commits
right at the outset is to mistake an effect of the principle for the
principle itself. The First Amendment protects a liberty-liberty
of expression-and it is an effect of this liberty that there is wide

' United States v Eichman, 110 S Ct 2404, 2410 (1990); Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397,
402 (1989).
' See Balkin, 1990 Duke L J at 383 (cited in note 1).
The ACLU, however, has remained steadfast in this respect.
Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 Yale L J 2087 (1991). This
article is related to his earlier Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L Rev 1405
(1986).
' Fiss, 100 Yale L J at 2101 (cited in note 5).
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and uninhibited discussion of political matters. Similarly, property
rights enable markets and the efficiencies they entail. But property
is not respected just because of the effect, economic efficiency;
rather the effect follows because property rights are respected in
principle.
Because Fiss substitutes the effect of liberty for liberty itself,
it seems natural for him to claim that the First Amendment may
compel making all important channels of public communication
available on the widest possible terms-especially providing them
to groups and points of view which are deemed insufficiently audible in the public debate. 7 In a benign application of this substitution of effect for principle, Fiss concludes that it would have been
unconstitutional for the National Endowment for the Arts not to
fund the famous Mapplethorpe photography exhibit.8 More startlingly, Fiss argues by analogy to the Prince Edward County case 9
that in extremis a court might order continued funding of the
NEA, if Congress chose to reduce its budget to prevent the NEA
from making the controversial grant.
The real trouble begins when this conception of the First
Amendment is pressed further to deny free speech protection to
speakers who wish not to pronounce certain views. The speech-assilence principle has been part of free speech law at least since the
flag salute case, West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette'°-which held that it is unconstitutional to compel an unwilling speaker to speak. The protection of this principle has already been denied to broadcasters, who may be compelled to carry
programs they deplore." Fiss's argument entails a denial of this
protection to newspapers as well.' 2

Id at 2100-01.
8 Id at 2103-04.
9 Id at 2105. See Griffin v School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 US 218, 233
(1964) ("[T]he District Court [can] require the Supervisors to exercise the power that is
theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial
discrimination a public school system [like] that operated in other counties in Virginia.").
10

319 US 624, 642 (1943).

See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367, 386 (1969), in which the Court
held that it was not unconstitutional for the FCC to impose "fairness doctrine" rules on
broadcasters requiring both that stations devote a reasonable amount of broadcast time to
the discussion of public issues and that each side of a debate be given "fair coverage."
" Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241, 243 n 1, 258 (1974),
in which the Court unanimously struck down a Florida statute which required any newspaper that "assail[ed]" a candidate in a political election to print upon demand any response
the candidate might have, free of charge, provided the reply took up no more space than the
negative comments.
"
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From this it is but a short step to suppression pure and simple. Civic republicans explain the historic exclusion of obscenity
from constitutional protection on the ground that obscenity does
not contribute to, but rather degrades, public (republican) discourse. 13 Obscenity law is a puzzle, and scholars may be forgiven
for this excursion. But the chickens come home to roost when
writers as diverse as Robert Bork 4 and Laurence Tribe 5 would
extend this analysis to deny First Amendment protection to flag
desecration. And UNESCO's infamous "new information order" is
upon us indeed as Catharine MacKinnon, 6 Richard Delgado, 7
Charles Lawrence,' 8 and Mari Matsuda 9 extend this argument to
speech that is offensive and insulting to vulnerable, disfavored
(and politically mobilized) groups. MacKinnon and those who follow her not only would strip some forms of uncivil discourse of
constitutional protection, but, characterizing them as affirmative
offenses to constitutional values, they would make these forms of
uncivil discourse themselves actionable as denials of constitutional
rights.2 0
Straddling these two lines of argument is, in practical terms,
the most important case: campaign finance regulation. This includes regulation of citizens' speech in the name of a "fairer" public debate, government subsidies of "under-financed" views, and
compelled speech by broadcasters, all to provide platforms for, or
" See, for

example, Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L J 1493, 1532 n 161

(1988); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: The Case of PornographyRegulation, 56 Tenn L Rev 291, 294 n 8 (1989).
14 See the report of Judge Bork's testimony before the House Judiciary Committee in
Robin Toner, Bush Allies Push Flag Amendment Before Panel, NY Times A14 (Jul 20,
1989).
15 See Laurence H. Tribe, Give Old Glory A Break: Protect It-And Ideas, NY Times
19 (Jul 3, 1989); Statutory and ConstitutionalResponses to the Supreme Court Decision in
Texas v. Johnson, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 99, 140 (1989) (statement of
Professor Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard Law School) ("Responses to Texas v. Johnson").
1" See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Frances Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights,
and Speech, in MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified. Discourses on Life and Law 163, 175-77
(Harvard, 1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography,Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv
CR-CL L Rev 1, 22-24 (1985).
" See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev 133, 172-79 (1982).
8 See Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 Duke L J 431.
19 See Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2331-48, 2356-57 (1989).
20 See Delgado, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 134 (cited in note 17); MacKinnon, 20 Harv
CR-CL L Rev at 38-39 (cited in note 16).
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to avoid swamping, viewpoints that the government deems insufficiently audible.2 1 The Supreme Court in Buckley v Valeo proclaimed: "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
This
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ....
2
3
concept, however, is precisely what some, including the dissenters
in Buckley and opinions in subsequent cases, 2 4 have celebrated.
This celebration has overlooked the Buckley Court's moderate
course in allowing campaign expenditure contribution limitations
in exchange for generous federal subsidies.

I.

HISTORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

American free speech law is as much a product of our history
as it is a true deduction from valid premises. Its contours are the
result of particular struggles and compromises, played out against
the background of familiar doctrinal structures in adjacent fields of
public and private law. It is also distinctively American. No other
nation claims as fierce and stringent a system of legal protection
for speech. It is the strongest affirmation of our national claim that
we put liberty ahead of other values. We are still relatively free
economically, though circumstances have made many qualifications
seem inevitable. But in freedom of expression we lead the world. It
is regrettable, but not surprising, that from time to time emergencies or passing tactical concerns lead to proposals to deform this
achievement. 25 Far more serious is the disposition to embrace permanent limitations on liberty in deference to other values. Historically, for example, the claims of religion have led to restraints on
2 See Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S Ct 1391, 1408 (1990) (Scalia

dissenting) (deploring this aspect of the Court's decision); Citizens Against Rent Control v
Berkeley, 454 US 290, 298-99 (1981); FirstNational Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765,
776 (1978); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 14-59 (1976).
2-2424 US 1, 48-49 (1976).
23 Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U Chi L Rev 255 (1992); Fiss, 100 Yale L J at
2101-06 (cited in note 5).
24 Buckley, 474 US at 265-66 (White concurring in part and dissenting in part); Austin,
110 S Ct at 1397-98 (Marshall writing for the Court); Citizens Against Rent Control, 454
US at 310-11 (White dissenting).
15 See Flag Protection Act, 18 USC § 700 (1989) (held unconstitutional in Eichman, 110
S Ct 2404). This Act was only one of several proposed flag-burning statutes and constitutional amendments designed to restrict the scope of First Amendment protection recognized
in Texas o Johnson, 491 US 397, 420 (1989). See generally, Responses to Texas v. Johnson
(cited in note 15). Much that was said in favor of these particular flag protection proposals
was probably aimed at heading off still worse incursions on the First Amendment. See, for
example, id at 55-64 (statement of Professor Walter Dellinger, Duke University Law
School).
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liberty, as in laws against blasphemy and heresy. In modern
times"6 the most constant and menacing manifestation of this disposition invokes the politics of community and equality: a community that politically mobilized agitators seek to impose, and an
equality where all are equally subject to the superior authority of
some leading class. We have now, as we have had since the time of
the Jacobins, a determined band of intellectuals, politicians, and
publicists enraged that human material is recalcitrant to their
projects to level the condition of all men in the equal service of
their particular visions of community. This project is not the pursuit of equality of opportunity, equality before the law, or even the
decent instinct to protect all against misery and need. It is the pursuit of equality of results. The partisans of equal subordination to
the claims of politics have always been driven to crush what stood
in their way: religion,2 7 talent, property, science, and most of all,
liberty.
It is against this background that I see the elaborate recent
campus speech codes. 8 As I shall show, it is hard to credit the
claim that these codes are necessary to promote academic values of
free and civil inquiry against the ill effects of ugly actions directed
against minorities and women. It is more illuminating to see a desire to punish those who blaspheme against community. As with all
blasphemy, some of the speech provoking these codes is vulgar,
despicable and barely coherent, but this anti-blasphemy response
29
also sweeps up speech that is merely heterodox or vivid.
The difficult theoretical problems presented by the law's treatment of commercial speech, fraud, deception, assault, solicitation,
and conspiracy assist the case for these codes, as does the difficulty
of accommodating the right of free expression to other private
rights. We know that the argument for free speech includes both
2

This does not include wartime and national security concerns. Schenck v United

States, 249 US 47, 51-53 (1919); Dennis v United States, 341 US 494, 511-17 (plurality)
(1951); id at 519-56 (Frankfurter concurring); Scales v United States, 367 US 203, 228-30
(1961).
2

Recall the mass murders committed by the Jacobins in Nantes with a mechanized

efficiency not to be encountered again until the time of Hitler. Simon Schama, Citizens: A
Chronicle of the French Revolution ch 17 (Knopf, 1989).
28 These campus free speech codes are summarized in Comment, Campus Anti-Slur
Regulations: Speakers, Victims, and the FirstAmendment, 79 Cal L Rev 919 (1991), David
F. McGowan and Ragesh K. Tangri, A LibertarianCritique of University Restrictions of
Offensive Speech, 79 Cal L Rev 825 (1991). See also Elaine S. Povich, ACLU Joins Hyde in
Free-Speech Fight, Chi Trib 6 (Mar 12, 1991).
29 See Dinesh D'Souza, IlliberalEducation: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus
129-56 (Free Press, 1991); Stephan Thernstrom, McCarthyism Then and Now, 4 Academic
Questions 14 (Winter 1990-91).
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speaker and audience. It encompasses a speaker's attempts to gain
his audience's attention, and thus extends beyond the right to
reach a willing audience."0 What of the potential listener who in
some circumstances does not wish to give her attention, or, having
given it, wishes to withdraw it? No theory of free speech allows a
speaker to pursue his audience into her home, break down her door
and unstop her ears. Time, place, and manner restrictions-content neutral-may allow the proper regime of accommodation. But the harassment debate gives this problem a new twist.
Are there not settings-the workplace or its analogues: a cafeteria,
a hospital, or the campus where one lives and works at getting an
education-where a listener is only willing to lend his attention to
speech that observes certain limits of decorum and civility? And, if
so, are these limits completely captured by traditional time, place,
and manner limits? Do these limits not refer to content as well?
Some such limits have been acknowledged ab omnibus et ubique.
But they depend on legal structures, particularly those relating to
31
property rights that are conventional and therefore manipulable.
This is apparent in the ebb and flow of decisions about picketing
32
and leafletting in shopping malls and parking lots.
I despair of providing a theoretical basis for free speech that is
at once true and elegant. By true I mean that it covers all, and
only, those cases that we conclude the First Amendment should
cover. By elegant I mean that the theory is a method of analysis
that may be used to generate doctrine, rather than a compendium
of ad hoc doctrines. However, this is not to say that philosophy
and deep political principles cannot illuminate, judge, justify, and
constrain legal doctrine. An examination of philosophical and political principles can improve our general understanding of the law
and provide insights into the proper foundation of free speech
theories.

30

Cohen v California, 403 US 15, 21-22 (1971); NAACP v Claiborne HardwareCo., 458

US 886, 928 (1982); Erznoznik v Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 208-12 (1975).
3' It is just at this point that Professor Sunstein, 59 U Chi L Rev at 263 (cited in note
23), inserts his knife into the oyster and endeavors to pry it open. It is the whole point of
my Article to argue that his effort does not succeed.
11 See Marsh v Alabama, 326 US 501, 509 (1946) (holding that access to the sidewalks
of a company-owned town was protected by the First Amendment); Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v Logan Valley Plaza, 391 US 308, 325 (1968) (holding that picketers
enjoy First Amendment protection to demonstrate in a shopping center complex); Hudgens
v NLRB, 424 US 507, 518-21 (1976) (overruling Logan Valley, holding that picketers do not
enjoy a First Amendment right to speak at a privately-owned shopping center).
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II. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
In an important article, Thomas Scanlon points out that philosophical speculation may establish the foundations of a particular
topic; for instance the proper measures and limits of distributive
justice, the notion of sexual or personal privacy, the propriety of
blaming an actor for certain results he causes, or the nature and
status of the claim to freedom of expression. 3 He calls the conclusions we reach at this level foundational. 4 They need not be formulated with a mathematical rigor that permits unequivocal applications to the range of concrete circumstances. When we survey
those concrete circumstances, we may get a rough idea of how a
particular society would look if it embodied the foundational principles. He calls this realization of foundational principles in concrete circumstances the level of policy." Between the foundational
and the policy levels stands the level of rights that we recognize in
order to approximate these principles in the real world. 6 I have
made a similar argument, that "the artificial reason of the law"37 is
necessary to make concrete the abstract, general reflections of philosophy. Philosophy may determine the general orientation of our
judgments, but it cannot supply the machinery by which those
judgments are instantiated by the law in actual social systems.3 8
Ronald Dworkin marks this distinction as between what he calls
background rights and institutional rights. I prefer Dworkin's terminology because it shows that at the "foundational" or philosophical level, just as much as at the level of positive law, our values
may include rights-moral claims that may not be balanced away

"
Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U
Pitt L Rev 519 (1979).
31Id at 535.
35Id.

36 Id.

" In using this phrase I borrow from Lord Coke, who first coined the term in his famous reply to King James I's assertion that since law was grounded in reason, he should be
able to decide cases as well as judges. Lord Coke stated:
God had endowed his Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature;
but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes... [of
action] are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of law ....
12 E Co Rep 63, 65 (James I 1655), reprinted in 77 Eng Rep 1342, 1343 (William Green &
Sons, 1907).
" See Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 Tex
L Rev 35, 56-58 (1981). See also Charles Fried, Is Liberty Possible?,in Sterling M. McMurrin, ed, Liberty, Equality, and Law: Selected Tanner Lectures on Moral Philosophy 91, 134
(Utah, 1987), reprinted from 3 The Tanner Lectures in Human Values 89 (Utah, 1982).
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in the way that competing interests are readily balanced against
each other.39
Freedom of expression is properly based on autonomy: the
Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in himself,
an equal sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to
the greatest liberty compatible with the like liberties of all
others.4 ° Autonomy is the foundation of all basic liberties, including liberty of expression. There are famous difficulties in defining
these spheres of liberty against encroachment by the actions of
others-one man's liberty is another's constraint-and many have
despaired of deriving any practical conclusions from this principle
as it relates to laws bearing on conduct. But the way is much
clearer with respect to thought, expression and persuasion. There
the claim to liberty runs directly to the foundational. Our ability to
deliberate, to reach conclusions about our good, and to act on
those conclusions is the foundation of our status as free and rational persons. No conviction forced upon us can really be ours at
all. Limits may be put on my actions insofar as my actions impinge
on others, but my status as a rational sovereign requires that I be
free to judge for myself what is good and how I shall arrange my
life in the sphere of liberty that the similar spheres of others leave
me.4 1 I cede authority to the state to draw the necessary concrete
boundaries between our respective spheres of action. But no such
necessity requires, indeed self-respect forbids, that I cede to the
state the authority to limit my use of my rational powers. That is
why lying, while not the most damaging offense to another's moral
right, is one of the clearest.4 2 It is also why the state has no claim
to dominion over our minds: what we believe, what we are persuaded to believe, and (derivatively) what others may try to per43
suade us to believe.

19 As Dworkin correctly points out, however, sometimes it is proper to balance competing rights. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously ch 4 and appendix (Harvard,
1978).
40 See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Bobbs-Merrill,
1959); Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
41 We should not confuse this Kantian definition of autonomy with a completely different notion: the subjectivity of the good. To claim, as Kantians do, that the moral value of
the good depends on its being freely chosen and that therefore the capacity to choose is
primary, does not imply at all that there are no objective criteria of the good, or that the
good is whatever is chosen, nor yet some thesis about the subjectivity of values.
412 See Charles Fried, Right and Wrong ch 3 (Harvard, 1978).
13 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum
L Rev 334 (1991).
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The realization of these foundational rights in the First
Amendment law of free expression illustrates the relation of institutions to foundations. The First Amendment does not protect a
person from lies or imposition by private individuals. Rather the
First Amendment protects against impositions by government-"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, '4 4 "nor shall any state deprive any person ... [of his free
speech liberties] . ' 45 The Constitution is hardly concerned with the
government lying, and few have argued that you have a constitutional right to have the government refrain from lying to you. 4 6
Rather, the pressing problems center around government restrictions on speech by others. Indeed, some of the cases in which government might be seen as acting on the Kantian principle-punishing false or misleading speech, or speech designed to
circumvent rational evaluation-are just those in which free speech
objections to government interference are typically made, though
not always successfully. The paradigmatic free speech case is one
in which government prevents a person from speaking or punishes
him for having spoken-presumably to deter such speech in the
future.
The Constitution is concerned only with limits on government,
even though a person's autonomy may be assaulted as much if an
employer, a neighbor or a family member silences him or stops his
access to speech. Other legal norms take care of non-governmental
offenses. The background system of private rights goes a long way
toward vindicating free speech rights against private actors. John
may not interfere with Jane's decision to publish Bill's letter in her
newspaper. But neither may Bill complain if Jane decides she does
not want to publish that letter. It is her newspaper. I may say what
I want at a gathering in my own home, but I have no right to invade your home in order to give a speech there. Free speech values
are preserved in this process because of the neutrality of these or-

" US Const, Amend I.
" US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
" What would such a right look like? How would it be vindicated? In limited circumstances defamations by government officials are actionable. Paul v Davis, 424 US 693, 701
(1976); Barr v Matteo, 360 US 564, 572-74 (1959). But a generalized cause of action for
government deception or concealment would, it is feared, make courts actors in controversies that are primarily political. The role of keeping government honest is left to the enterprise of the press and political opponents. The furthest the law of the Constitution has gone
has been in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555, 575-77 (1980) (extending
First Amendment right to receive information by applying it to the right to public access to
criminal trials).
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dinary background systems of tort, property and criminal law.4 7
Perhaps this is why for a long time no one thought to apply constitutional free speech analysis to the law of defamation-unlike
criminal libel, where the First Amendment always was thought to
apply-until the misuse of that cause of action by the Alabama
state police forced latent problems into the open. 48 This is also
why commentators have not drawn into question laws against
fraud and assault: they protect private rights, and often at the instance of a private party, not the state.
Is this simply an adventitious division of function between
constitutional law and common and statutory law? Or is there
something foundational (in Scanlon's sense) about protection
against the government in the free speech area that makes it the
proper and sole focus of constitutional limitations? In Max
Weber's formula, government represents the monopoly of organized force of the community, that from which there is no escape,
the final authority. 49 (Of course there may be powerful groupings
in a territory, and sometimes it is these groupings and not the
state that have the last word. But that is a pathological condition-at least in a context where state and law and a constitution
count for something.5 0 If gangs of thugs or warring sects generally
predominate over regular authority, then we do not have the context of law or the state at all. And if we do have a state, then the
influence of private powers in principle is not inescapable.) The
state has the power, for instance, to tax the powerful and redistribute wealth so that new, competing centers of power might grow up.
But this is not just a definitional matter. It is fundamental because, as Kant, Rousseau, Locke, and Hobbes each in his own way
saw, the state is the only entity to which we delegate this ultimate
coercive authority over ourselves. In contractual agreements with

"I Here is what Sunstein's critique, 59 U Chi L Rev at 263 (cited in note 23) misses.
These background systems are indifferent-blessedly-to the ideological uses to which their
beneficiaries would put them. Sunstein's "New Deal" for free speech would make room for
systematic manipulation of these background systems to favor their use for "virtuous," "republican" speech.
48 New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 268 (1964). There were more modest
grounds on which the Sullivan case might have been decided. There was the obvious fact,
for instance, that no reputational harm could possibly have been done to Bull Connor and
his men by the New York Times advertisement-so that the punitive and presumed damages could have been seen as the result of the state rather than the parties acting.
" See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (translated by
A.M. Henderson and Tacott Parsons) (Oxford, 1947); Max Rheinstein, ed, Max Weber on
Law in Economy and Society ch 13 (Simon and Schuster, 1954).
50 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law ch 6 (Oxford, 1961).
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fellow citizens we make and dissolve arrangements, but we acknowledge in the state a power over us whose authority we may
not ignore-except by revolution.
To see this aspect of inescapability, consider the case of a municipal ordinance limiting speech and compare it to blacklisting by
a major national media network. The first seems eminently escapable, the latter is everywhere in the national territory. But even
that extreme contrast does not quite work. The government, even a
municipal government, can make laws to control the broadcast network, and these laws will be effective within its territory; if it may
not, that is only because the municipality is subject to another government. In short, the state is different. The state is the law, and
the law is final-even when the law appears in the humble guise of
a municipal ordinance. That is why our constitutionalism has built
into the law a protection for certain fundamental rights against law
(the state).
The Constitution protects primarily against state silencing of
private speech because silencing is distinctive. Silencing invokes
the power of the state against both speaker and audience. It stops
both mouth and ears. It prevents a transaction between citizens.
Classic free speech law privileges speech transactions between citizens as none of the state's business. We acknowledge the state's
authority over us in all sorts of situations, but by silencing, the
state is asking us to acquiesce in sovereignty over our minds, our
rational capacities. That is a deeper kind of subordination than
one which at least leaves us free to judge that what the state has
done is wrong.
In the case in which the audience does not care to receive the
communication, the offense to autonomy is harder to identify. At
its limit, where no injury is done to others by the unwanted
speech, silencing offends a pure autonomy interest: a right to act
(here, speak) where there is no harm to others. But cannot the
frustration of the audience's wish that the speaker be silent constitute a kind of harm to it? Perhaps, but not one that should be
cognizable in law. It is central to the idea of a fundamental right to
liberty that no one should curtail (or ask the state to curtail) the
liberty of another when the only reason is disagreement about another's conception of the good. State regulation of unwelcome expression is the punishment of pure ideas or beliefs-the outlawing
of having ideas or beliefs, or of letting people know that you have
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them.5 1 This injustice is related, but not identical, to that done in
the communicative case. We derive them both from the notion that
in a free, just society (a liberal society) no one may be compelled to
adopt or to deny any particular theory of the good (although he
may be compelled to act on such a theory when communal action
is otherwise warranted). This concept of justice limits what we may
do to punish unilateral expression and what we may do to forbid
communications that may convince an audience to modify its conception of the good.
Private impositions and limitations differ fundamentally from
state impositions. First, they issue from the limiting person's own
exercise of liberty: the newspaper does not wish to carry my op-ed
piece, the private university does not wish to include my intellectual system in its course of study. Second, these limitations derive
from other private rights that the limiter might have: rights to privacy, or more commonly, rights to property. A liberal society acknowledges private domains in part to allow the development of
individual conceptions of the good.52 If another individual can invoke the power of the state to override that dominion it is likely to
be an illiberal claim of authority by the state to adjudicate between two persons' conceptions of the good. Even a judgment by
the state that it would be good for you to hear a speech you do not
agree with while you are in your own private space is an illiberal
assertion of authority. By contrast, time, place, and manner regulations, which are content-neutral, are not an illiberal assertion of
authority, but rather a good faith attempt by the liberal state to
adjust zones of privacy without regard to what will be pursued
within those zones.
III. POLIING THE TRUTH
The foundational status of the state action doctrine answers
other questions about the accepted contours of constitutional free
speech doctrine. Expressions of opinion are the paradigms of what

5' Robert Bork argues that there is no difference between the state protecting against a
neighbor's smoke pollution and the discomfort that some experience when they believe that
their neighbors may be using contraceptives in their marital bedroom. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 7-11 (1971). Ignoring
the differences in the route and the mechanism by which your burning tires in your backyard and your reading dirty books in your den may occasion distress to your neighbor is a
mistake Bork shares with the civic republicans I criticize here.
52 We cannot derive the contours of the private domains from any general moral or
political principles. All we can derive is that there be some such domains. See Fried, Is
Liberty Possible? at 127 (cited in note 38).
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we protect. Free speech cases often explain that "[t]here is no such
thing as a false idea."5 3 But why may the state intervene to prohibit or punish factually false statements? 54 Defamation and deception are actionable wrongs, perhaps on the reasoning I have already offered: they vindicate private rights invoked by, or at least
on behalf of, private individuals. 55 But the First Amendment precludes punishment for generalized "public" frauds, deceptions, and
defamation.5 6 In political campaigns the grossest misstatements,
deceptions, and defamations are immune from legal sanction unless they violate private rights-that is, unless individuals are
defamed.
We should understand the group libel controversy in this
light. At common law a group libel is actionable at the instance of
a group member only if the generalized libel is adequately pointed
and the group sufficiently small so that each member may treat it
as the equivalent of an individual defamation. 57 Other liberal societies take a different tack, but one suspects thaf they are doing so
for one of two illiberal reasons. Perhaps they are punishing the
wickedness of the person who entertains such sentiments and does
not have the decency to keep them to himself. Or perhaps they
fear that the group libel will change the values and sentiments of
the public, much as a political campaign for a Marxist, Nazi or
other palpably evil political cause could be seen as an attempt to
corrupt public opinion. From the outset in this country we have

53 See, Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co., 110 S Ct 2695, 2705 (1990); Hustler v Falwell,
485 US 46, 51 (1988); Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 339-40 (1974).

5,See Milkovich, 110 S Ct at 2705; Gertz, 418 US at 340.
W. will have to consider why even this is sufficient to allow a general invocation of
We
state power. An analogous set of arguments might be developed to explain the tort of invasion of privacy and various proprietary actions such as infringement of copyright, publication of trade secrets, or publication of information that a reporter agreed by contract not to
release. See Ruzicka v Conde Nast Publications,Inc., 733 F Supp 1289, 1295-1300 (D Minn
1990). By a still more distant analogy, but one that I am inclined to credit, the government
itself may have certain proprietary rights which it may protect even if in doing so it restricts
speech. See Snepp v United States, 444 US 507, 514-16 (1980).
" See James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 Madison's Works 544,
cited in Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697, 713, 717-18, 722-23 (1931). See also United States v
Hudson & Goodwin, 11 US (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that there is no federal criminal
common law protecting newspaper editors from prosecution under the common-law crime of
seditious libel). In this respect our law is distinct from that of other countries-even quite
decent liberal ones-which recognize categories of public defamation such as insulting the
nation, or the flag, or the head of state. This is why flag desecration laws were so profoundly
contrary to the American free speech tradition.
'

Neiman-Marcus Co. v Lait 107 F Supp 96, 100 (S D NY 1952).
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generally set our face against such illiberal laws based on such illiberal reasons.5 s
But why do we, along with all liberal nations, treat public deception in a privileged way? Why is there no legal sanction against
false accusations against a political program in newspaper editorials? Why may a television commentator misstate the content of a
Supreme Court decision or a pronouncement of the President and
thereby misinform with impunity? We are familiar with the usual
accounts: public debate must be "uninhibited, robust and wideopen, '5 9 and the Meiklejohn thesis that the First Amendment protects all speech which bears on matters on which voters have to
make decisions.6 0 But these accounts seem to announce the conclusion rather than explain why we allow actions for deception and
defamation in the private domain but not the public.
The answer must be that in the public domain the state is
enforcing a view of the truth about itself. Because it is interested,
it cannot be trusted. The public must be left to sort out the truth
for itself. Does this mean that the Kantian principle allows a distinction between fact and opinion, at least in principle justifying
the imposition of authority in the realm of truth?
We would be willing to delegate to others the task of ferreting
out and stopping some forms of deception. However, for' other
types of potential deception the risk seems too great to allow this
delegation. We would be glad to allow an expert to assure the correctness of food labels, claims for medicines and the accuracy of
commercial advertising. Compare this to a scenario where the government prevents or punishes the publication of a scientific paper
based on false, unreliable, or fabricated data. (Recall the cold fusion episode.) Our reluctance is much greater. We do not allow the
suppression of articles about ill-founded diets, exercise programs,
or even schemes for making huge fortunes or never having to pay
taxes. Books and magazines of this sort may be sold with impunity;
yet our intuitions change drastically if the speaker proposes a commercial transaction in which he sells something other than
speech."

11 The major departures have been the Alien and Sedition Laws and the prosecution of
Eugene Debs, a candidate for President who had received almost a million votes. See Debs v
United States, 249 US 211 (1919).
"o New York Times, 376 US at 270.
60 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the
People 26-27 (Harper, 1960).
"' Note the way we can distinguish the two: the legal sanction must attach to the sale of
something other than the speech. If a health food store prominently displays crank articles
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At one end of the spectrum are technical questions on which
all reasonable, informed persons would agree. The autonomy principle is only implicated when the government seeks to control
speech directed to more general or more abstract issues. With
these matters, autonomy prohibits irrevocable delegation of the authority to control access to our minds. The issue of commercial
fraud illustrates this spectrum. Most would accept the risk of erroneous fact-finding by properly designated government agencies
(courts, juries) as a cost of being able to seek redress against others
who have cheated us, even though we know that the government
agencies might sometimes punish honest and even accurate speech
in the process. Where government's own interests are at stake (as
in political discussions and the promotion of candidates), however,
we withdraw this delegation because of the inherent conflict of interest. This touches on the autonomy principle's objection to allowing the delegee to control the avenues that might lead to the
modification or withdrawal of the delegation.
This brings us to the interesting recent development of constitutional protection for commercial speech, itself a victory for the
autonomy principle. The initial extension of free speech rights to
commercial speech in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council6 2 was bold and correct. It was not, however, radical. The protection from the outset covered only opinion
and true speech." In Linmark Associates, Inc. v Willingboro, Justice Marshall, for a unanimous Court, explained the issue precisely:
The [town, in forbidding the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold"
signs] acted to prevent its residents from obtaining certain information .... The [town] has sought to restrict the free flow
of this data because it fears that otherwise homeowners will
make decisions inimical to what the [town] views as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interest of the township . . . . If dissemination of this information can be restricted, then every locality in the country can suppress any
facts that reflect poorly on the locality, so long as a plausible
claim can be made that disclosure would cause the recipients
of the information to act "irrationally."6 4

about the healing powers of lecithin next to the lecithin rack, it is the sale of the lecithin
that can be regulated, not the sale of the magazine.
62 425 US 748, 770-73 (1976) (statute prohibiting publication of pharmaceutical prices
violates the First Amendment).
11 Id at 771.
- 431 US 85, 96 (1977).
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The commercial speech cases recognize the autonomy right to
make up one's own mind about a proposal that includes no lies.
The justifications offered for restricting truthful commercial
speech boil down either to a paternalistic claim to control the judgments of even undeceived citizens or, more accurately, to the capture of governmental power by a self-serving faction of commercial
actors seeking to entrench its own economic interests. In brushing
past these justifications, the Court was not reinstating Lochner-era
control over economic regulation. Instead, the Court recognized
free speech values in an area where they had been overlooked,
while using Lochner-era arguments to conclude that the state had
not met its burden of proof in justifying restrictions on free speech.
In pure cases of economic due process like Lochner6 5 there would
be only the Court's economic judgment.

IV.

ASSAULT AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT

The analysis that illuminated the issues of defamation also illuminates the constitutional status of a class of speech that comes
closer to the campus speech codes: assaults, threats, and workplace
harassment.6 6 As we have seen, what made the law of defamation
tolerable was the limitation to false speech and the government's
limited role as arbiter between conflicting invocations of private
rights. But now consider cases in which a person threatens another
with physical harm.
The law of assault is grounded not in the communication of
information (a threat, after all, is not just a statement of fact), but
in the physical imposition for which the assault is a preparatory
step. " An assault is more like the signal that triggers a criminal act
and therefore is punishable as a part of that criminal design. s It is
"

Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).

" See generally, Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 Ohio St L J 481 (1991).
'7 See generally, Claiborne Hardware, 458 US at 909-11 (so long as means are peaceful,
"coercive" and "offensive" speech is protected); Pipefitters Local Union v United States,
407 US 385, 421-22 (1972) (discussing election campaign law that prohibited unions from
using threats to elicit contributions from members); Watts v United States, 394 US 705, 712
(1969) (Fortas dissenting) (hearing should have been held on question of whether threat by
inductee to shoot President Johnson was a knowing and willful threat).
68 Another intellectual puzzle, which the law has dealt with by taking it for granted, is
the use of speech to further criminal agreements and enterprises, as when words are used to
join a conspiracy, to give orders, or to supply instructions in furtherance of some criminal
scheme. In all these cases the law has understood that the words are not being used to
express an idea or an attitude so much as they serve as signals and actions. I can help you to
build a bomb by supplying parts and helping you assemble them or by giving you the in-
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similar to a blackmail letter, for example, which is not primarily a
communication of information or a report of an attitude but more
a proposal or consummation of a transaction-like the offer or acceptance of a contract. Sexual harassment of the quid pro quo variety (as opposed to the hostile environment type) has some of this
quality: it is not the expression of opinion or statement of fact that
is objectionable, but rather the offer to exchange workplace advantages for sexual favors. 9
So it is inapposite to draw analogies between assault and cases
of hostile environment harassment or of grave insult-such as in
campus hate speech or public flag desecration. The latter are not
preparatory to some physical imposition; or if they are, then it is
the imposition that makes them wrongful. Instead, what is at work
in such cases is the use of speech to cause emotional distress.
Remember that conveying information is not all there is to the
free expression principle. Insults may contain a point of view that
the speaker is entitled to express and his audience to hear. "Strong
and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled
in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to stimulate his
audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals ...., 0 And if

the audience is the object of the insult, the speaker's interest in
expression still supplies half of the privilege, which is enough to
prevail. Certainly the privilege can't be overcome by the victim's
interest in remaining unaware of the speaker's low opinion of him.
Hence the difference between receiving harassing phone calls or
being bombarded by invective on the street or at work, and the
scenario in which one receives a single letter containing the substance of these views. We are not inclined to protect a person
against the knowledge of another's bad opinion. Instead, it is the
intrusion that is the basis for sanction.
Intrusion embodies the notion of countervailing right. You
may not give a political speech in my living room against my will,
structions to make the bomb. All this falls outside the bounds of First Amendment protection, but the boundaries may be fuzzy and a sophisticated manipulator of ideas may make
something that is squarely in one category look like it is also in the other. But we need not
be fooled. For a discussion of the appropriateness of a prior restraint preventing publication
of the technical information necessary to build a bomb, see Note, United States v. Progressive, Inc.: The FaustianBargain and the First Amendment, 75 Nw U L Rev 538 (1980). For
a thorough and illuminating general exploration of this question see Kent Greenawalt,
Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 81-89, 281-82 (Oxford, 1989).
69 See Ellison v Brady, 924 F2d 872, 879 (9th Cir 1991); Hirschfeld v New Mexico
CorrectionsDep't, 916 F2d 572, 575 (10th Cir 1990); Dockter v Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc.,
913 F2d 456, 461 (7th Cir 1990).
70 Claiborne Hardware, 458 US at 928.

19921

A Threat to Liberty

because for quite neutral reasons I have a property/privacy interest
in my home. It might also be argued that I have a right to pass
along the street without being pursued by unwanted invective. The
harAsser in this setting is as much an intruder on my privacy as the
beggar who corners me on a lonely subway platform. 71 A rule
against this sort of harassment is a time, place, and manner restriction, a content-neutral notion that protects against non-consensual
intrusions upon one's right to be in a public or other place in relative tranquility. This is much easier to see with respect to workplace harassment: the workplace is not quite your home, but
neither is it speakers' corner in Hyde Park. For reasons that are
quite content-neutral the law might assign me a right to limit the
intrusions I must endure at work to those that relate to my work.
The same is true of a college dormitory and some parts of a campus. People should no more be free to pursue me into my dormitory than into my apartment house lobby. 72 This analysis also explains the doctrines about public fora and limited public fora,73
doctrines that may be seen as attempts to adjust conflicting rights
of speakers and the private rights of property owners, audiences,
and bystanders.
This institutional adjustment implicates a further institutional
principle: restrictions on freedom of expression, if they are to be
justified by invocation of some proper governmental purpose (such
as protecting countervailing private rights), must be content- and
viewpoint-neutral. It is not obvious that this crucial institutional
device is a direct manifestation of foundational values. After all, if
the government forbids cross burning7 4 but not flag burning, the
silencing would seem to be as good or as bad, regardless of whether
someone else is also silenced. But in fact content-neutrality is the
First Amendment's version of a crucial device deployed throughout
law to enforce adherence to principle where good purposes are invoked to justify actions that have bad effects. To look only at constitutional law, we require that where legislation makes racial dis71 See Young v New York City Transit Authority, 903 F2d 146, 152-54 (2d Cir 1990),
cert denied, 111 S Ct 516 (1990) (upholding against First Amendment challenge NYCTA
prohibitions against all begging and panhandling in certain public transit facilities).
72 See Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77, 86 (1949); Martin v Struthers, 319 US 141, 143, 148
(1943).
11 See, for example, United States v Kokinda, 110 S Ct 3115, 3118-20 (1990); Frisby v
Schultz, 487 US 474, 479-81, 484 (1988); Cornelius v NAACP, 473 US 788, 799-800 (1985);
Perry Education Ass'n v Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 US 37, 44-46 (1983).
", Compare In the Matter of the Welfare of R.A.V., 464 NW2d 507, 509-11 (Minn
1991), cert granted, R.A.V. v St. Paul, 111 S Ct 2795 (1991), with Eichman, 110 S Ct at
2410.
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tinctions, it be narrowly tailored to a permissible and weighty
government purpose;7 5 where Congress conditions a federal grant
to a state on the state's acceptance of the federal "request" that it
adopt a federal policy in an area traditionally reserved to the state
(such as the regulation of alcohol), the grant may not be conditioned in a way that is under- or over-inclusive relative to its
proper purpose;" and uncompensated exactions of property rights
from private owners in return for regulatory permissions are valid
only if the condition bears a sufficiently close relation to the regulatory purpose. 77 In all of these cases the law assures that important values are not transgressed under the pretext of serving other
ends, or even that they not be lightly (though honestly) sacrificed
to those other ends.7 8 Where the values trenched upon are less
weighty, all the law requires is a rational relation to a permissible
governmental goal. But no one suggests that the government can
so easily justify infringements on free expression.
In some contexts this mix of foundational commitments and
their somewhat untidy expression at the institutional level of doctrine would be acceptable and reasonable, and no great commotion
would ensue. But the controversy over campus hate speech and the
(over)reaction of some institutions has put such common sense accommodations under great pressure. Away from such pressures one
would recognize the contingent and even arbitrary nature of some
of the lines we must draw to adjust these conflicting rights. That is
the nature of legal (institutional) protection for abstract (background) rights and values.
V.

CAMPUS SPEECH CODES

If only minor intrusions were at stake it would not have been
difficult or controversial to work out a set of rules that marked a
person's private (or semi-private) space and condemn incursions
75 City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 505-08 (1989); Palmore v Sidoti,
466 US 429, 432-33 (1984).
71 South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203, 214-15 (1987) (O'Connor dissenting). O'Connor
argues that attaching a condition to highway fund grants such that a portion of a grant to a
particular state will be withheld if that state allows alcohol to be sold to minors is underinclusive because it does not address the lion's share of the problem (adults between twentyone and thirty), and over-inclusive because it stops teenagers from drinking even when they
would not be driving.
Nollan v California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 834-35 (1987).
78 This is the law's version of the moral principle of the law of double effect, which
suggests that it is more than an institutional device, albeit an important and pervasive one.
See generally, Charles Fried, Right and Wrong-Preliminary Considerations, 5 J Legal
Stud 165, 174-85 (1976); Fried, Right and Wrong at 201-05 (cited in note 42).
7
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upon it. But a look at some of the campus speech codes that universities developed in the wake of a widespread campaign for them
suggests that the regulators have bigger game in their sights.
Regulations at Michigan, Stanford, Wisconsin 9 and other
schools ° go beyond protecting the privacy of those who work and
live in their midst. The University of Michigan regulations, for instance, condemn speech in the classroom, on bulletin boards, in
campus fora, in school newspapers and in mailings that
stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era
veteran status, and that ... [c]reates an intimidating, hostile,
or demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities."'
What is condemned here is the content of the speech-not the
trespass on the space of a reluctant audience which should find
some conventional precinct of tranquility.
The ideas the universities condemn are false and offensive, but
the universities do not condemn all false and offensive ideas. For
example, an invective condemning the United States as an oppressor nation or condemning capitalism as a form of exploitation may
be repeated with impunity. The same impunity would extend to
invectives directed against students and professors seen as agents,
apologists or running dogs of an oppressor nation and of capitalism. Individuals within the community may not espouse some
forms of race and gender superiority, but may espouse others. Individuals may advocate Marxism and the most extreme forms of militant feminism. And none of these codes would condemn burning
the American flag, even to affront a gathering of veterans or the
71 See U.W.M. Post, Inc. v Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 1991 WL
206819 (E D Wis).
80 See note 28. Of course only public universities are subject to the strictures of the

First Amendment, and for the state to restrict the right of private institutions to control
discourse in their communities as they saw fit would in itself be a violation of academic
freedom (a violation I would expect some of the apologists for this wave of repression to
howl most vociferously against). A bill introduced by Congressman Hyde and supported by
the ACLU makes this mistake. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Henry Hyde and the ACLU Propose
a Fate Worse than PCness, Wall St J A15 (May 1, 1991); Povich, Chi Trib at 6 (cited in
note 28). It is also true, however, that as members of the academic community we may
protest against suppression of speech within it, though not on constitutional grounds.
" The University of Michigan Policy on Discrimination and DiscriminatoryHarassment by Students in the University Environment 3 (1988), cited in McGowan and Tangri,
79 Cal L Rev at 920 (cited in note 28).
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widows and orphans of soldiers killed in battle. The universities
condemn ideas as such: individuals may not express certain views
in the way they believe most likely to attract an audience, though
precisely the same forms of expression may be used to convey
ideas and sentiments less provocative to locally protected sensibilities. This discrimination makes clear that those who promulgate
these regulations assign to themselves the authority to determine
which ideas are false and which false ideas people may not express
as they choose. Breaches of courtesy and good manners may be
akin to breaches of content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations, but the benign claim that these regulations simply seek to
produce a more courteous community is belied by the fact that not
all breaches of courtesy and good manners fall under the ban. Indeed some of the proponents of these codes scorn the idea of content neutrality. 2 The ban is an exercise of power. It shows who is
boss. Thus the holders of noxious ideas are suppressed and the rest
of the community is impressed and intimidated by this display of
political might.
Thomas Grey, one of the drafters of the Stanford code, provides vivid confirmation of my thesis in a short article explaining
and justifying that code.8 3 He is an evidently decent, reasonable
man, quite committed to liberal free speech principles. He begins
by acknowledging, as do I, that "civility and courtesy in manner of
speech can be required in the classroom from teachers and students alike."8 4 I would go further and acknowledge a title to enforce such norms beyond the classroom-in the student unions,
dining halls, dormitory meeting rooms and other common places of
the university. But Grey is unwilling to enact any such "requirement" in order to deal with the incidents we all deplore. He states
without explanation at the outset of his article: "[T]his value is not
best pursued by coercive disciplinary regulations of campus-wide
application. 8 5 One is left to wonder why. Toward the end of his

82 See Matsuda, 87 Mich L Rev at 2350-51 (cited in note 19). See also Nat Hentoff,

Stanford and the Speech Police, Wash Post A19 (Jul 21, 1990).
83 Thomas C. Grey, DiscriminatoryHarassment and Free Speech, 14 Harv J L & Pub
Pol 157 (1991). The Stanford regulation requires three elements to be satisfied to prove an
offense: intent to insult or degrade an individual or small group, direct address of the speech
to the individual(s), and the use of "insulting or 'fighting words.'" Stanford University,
FundamentalStandard Interpretation:Free Expression and DiscriminatoryHarassment1
(Jun 1990), cited in id at 160-61.
84 Grey, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 157 (cited in note 83).
85 Id.
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piece, and in another connection, he provides his answer. He concludes that the code he helped draft
is asymmetrical in the following sense. In those unhappy moments when the contemporary campus becomes a multi-cultural armed camp, the Stanford regulation would prevent me
from firing my most powerful verbal assault weapons across
racial, sexual, or sexual preference lines. By contrast, people
of color, women, and gays and lesbians can use all the words
they have at their disposal against me. This result seems an
impermissible failure of viewpoint neutrality to some civil
86
libertarians.
This asymmetry would seem to be a defect-an injury not only to
traditional free speech principles of content- and viewpoint-neutrality, but also to the value of civility.
That something not quite wholesome is going on here is evident from the labored justification Grey offers for the code's conceded lack of viewpoint and content neutrality. Not only does Grey
reject general campus civility codes, he also rejects disciplinary
rules based on such "traditionally recognized exceptions to full
First Amendment protection like 'defamation,' 'fighting words,' or
speech that constitutes 'intentional infliction of emotional distress.' ,,87 These latter grounds for regulation might sweep into
their net false or unsubstantiated charges of racism or sexism and
epithets used against males, whites, or heterosexuals. That is precisely why Grey rejects such grounds of regulation in favor of an
analogy to cases brought under Title VII, s8 where the claim is that
the employer who allows derogatory epithets creates a work envi-

86 Id at 162.
97 Id at 158 (footnotes omitted). Grey is actually on somewhat shaky ground. The
citation to the fighting words exception is to Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 573
(1942), but more recent decisions have cast considerable doubt on the vitality of that precedent. See Brandenburgv Ohio, 395 US 444, 448 (1969); Lewis v New Orleans, 415 US 130,
132 (1974) (distinguishing Chaplinsky); Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518, 528 (1972). And for
the emotional distress doctrine, Grey's citation asks us to see Hustler v Falwell, 485 US 46
(1988). But the Falwell decision held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
public figures from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in the absence of a showing that a publication contained a false statement of fact
made with "actual malice"-a standard of proof adopted in "recognition of the fundamental
importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."
Id at 50.
88Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (1972). Section

2000e-2(d)-(i) prohibits workplace discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin.
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ronment more hostile to women and minorities and thus discriminates against them in providing employment opportunities.
The analogy is labored, and surprisingly so given the less
troublesome and closer analogies that Grey has at hand but rejects.
First, the one Supreme .Court case cited to support the analogy did
not discuss the First Amendment in reviewing a district court's
failure to consider a woman's claim that her employer had sexually
discriminated by allowing the creation of a workplace environment
hostile to female employees.8 9 More analytically, the hostile environment cases assume that the employer has both the common law
right and the ability to guard against offensive conditions for all of
his employees. The employer violates Title VII because of the deficient exercise of his authority (and common law duty) to provide a
reasonably dignified work environment for all of his employees.
Stanford is not in the position of the Congress of the United
States, which passes anti-discrimination laws against the background of state law employment rights and obligations. Its position
is rather analogous to the employer who is assumed to be entitled
to enforce civility generally-an authority Grey declines to exercise-and who is faulted for failing to enforce it in the one respect
which is, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, a subject of federal congressional concern.
Is it unreasonable for me to conclude that one who shrinks
from banning from the campus extreme and distressing verbal
abuse generally, but will punish insults directed at "blacks, Latinos
or gays," 90 seems more interested in making a political statement
and showing political solidarity than in protecting the civility of
discourse in the academic community? If you think me churlish in
hinting at mauvaise foi where I have demonstrated no more than
faulty reasoning, then I ask you to consider what Grey offers in
reply: Those, like me, who seek symmetry, content- and viewpointneutrality, are guilty of preaching "the Plessy9" doctrine" of separate-but-equal 92 rejected in Brown v Board of Education.9 3 But
here Grey begs the question ferociously. Whether Grey likes it or
not (and I suppose he dislikes it very much), there are grounds for
saying that modern constitutional doctrine rejects separate-but89Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 65-67 (1986). See Grey, 14 Harv J L &
Pub Pol at 159 n 10 (cited in note 83).
90 Grey, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 162 (cited in note 83).
91Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537, 550-51 (1896).
92 Grey, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 162-63 (cited in note 83).
93

347 US 483 (1954).
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equal in order to embrace the principle of colorblindness first
stated in the Plessy dissent,9 4 and the grounds are at least as good
as those for saying that modern constitutional doctrine endorses
95
the "asymmetry" that moves Grey and his fellow campus Solons.
As you sow, so shall you reap. The result of the kind of asymmetry Grey celebrates is campuses where people falsely deploy
raucous charges of racism and sexism not only with impunity but
with a fair chance of bringing down censure. Not only does this
diminish academic discourse; the reputation of the academy as the
haven of free and open discourse also suffers. The sophistries used
to defend the various campus speech codes have made intellectuals
and academia the deserved butt of public ridicule. The PC jokes
may not be very subtle, but they capture something that really is
there.
And what are we to make of the argument, first offered by
Catharine MacKinnon 6 and since given at least qualified support
by Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein:9 7 that some speech must
be shut down in the name of free speech because it tends to silence
those disparaged by it. MacKinnon does not only make the conventional point that the speech at issue threatens in straightforward ways to drown out or do violence to the victims. 8 If that
were the claim, it would come under familiar First Amendment
categories-fighting words, incitement to violence, the heckler's

"4This fundamental principle of colorblindness was first presented by Justice John M.
Harlan, the lone dissenter in Plessy:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights,
all citizens are equal before the law.
163 US at 559 (Harlan dissenting) (emphasis added).
" See J.A. Croson Co., 488 US at 493-94 (plurality opinion):
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly
reserved for remedial settings they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and
lead to a politics of racial hostility. . . . [T]he standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a
particular classification.
"[I agree] in particular with [the plurality's] conclusion that strict scrutiny must be applied
to all governmental classification by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is 'remedial' or
'benign.'" Id at 520 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
9' MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 163-65, 168-71 (cited in note 16).
97 Michelman, 56 Tenn L Rev at 294-96 (cited in note 13). Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and The First Amendment, 1986 Duke L J 589, 618-24.
98 MacKinnon also argues that pornography results in violence to the women in the
industry because they are often raped, Feminism Unmodified at 179-80 (cited in note 16),
and to women in general because it traumatizes them, id at 183, and also because it causes
some rapes. Id at 184-85.
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veto-and could be evaluated in those terms. No, here it is content
that is said to silence, and it purportedly does this silencing by
causing the audience-both the group disparaged and others in the
audience-to entertain certain false opinions: for example, about
the capacities, moral situation, and role of women.
Such an argument runs four-square into one of the two convictions at the very heart of free expression: that adult persons should
be free to come to whatever opinions of which they may be convinced.99 The purported silencing of which MacKinnon complains
is a silencing that comes about only if women become convinced
that they have no right to speak and if others are convinced that
women are not worth listening to. This is an odd kind of silencing.
Could the Roman Catholic Church complain, then, that Voltaire's
diatribes against it deprive it of religious freedom because the faith
of believers might be shaken and the willingness of non-believers
to entertain its claims lessened? Is Catharine MacKinnon herself
silenced by those who deploy good arguments against her? Are her
opponents silenced by her good arguments? Of course, MacKinnon
thinks her argument applies only when the better established inveigh against the less well-established. But this is irrelevant. If the
better off threaten to use force against the less fortunate, that
threat, like any threat of illegal or unjust action, is to be condemned. But arguments address the mind and the emotions; they
threaten only persuasion. MacKinnon wants a kind of affirmative
action in the realm of discourse, and like Robert Bork, 100 ignores
the special route by which speech attains its effect. The use of the
word silencing here is the kind of when-I-use-words-they-meanwhat-I-say gambit that gives academic discourse a bad name. 11'
VI.

DEBUNKING THE DROWN-OUT THEORY

It is but a short step from this line of illiberal reasoning to
Owen Fiss's thesis that courts may require the state to subsidize
access to the public forum by unpopular, unfamiliar, and illfunded views.' 02 Advocates could make the argument in terms of
" For an excellent critique of MacKinnon's thesis and the sense of those tempted to
admire it see Ronald M. Dworkin, Liberty and Pornography,NY Rev Books 12, 38 (Aug 15,
1991).
100 See note 51 and accompanying text.
101 George Orwell characterized this sort of language use as "consciously dishonest,"
pointing out that a tyrant might call his regime "democratic" in much the same way. See
George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, in A Collection of Essays by George
Orwell 162, 168-69 (Doubleday, 1954).
102 Fiss, 100 Yale L J at 2087-88 (cited in note 5).
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the Meiklejohn thesis of self-government and support for the fullest measure of public controversy,0 3 but these are not arguments
that we can take seriously. I doubt that Fiss would invoke them to
claim support for the very ideas MacKinnon and the University of
Michigan authorities would shut down. Rather, the idea is that our
society has victimized certain groups-some racial minorities,
women, homosexuals-and that justice (if not the Constitution) requires compensation in the public forum as well as everywhere
else.
To be sure, if government controlled all the resources, then
very little would be left of the value of free speech. There are two
responses, however, to this concern. First, as classic liberals have
always known but socialists have forgotten, a limited government
and a vigorous private sector firmly beyond government's reach are
crucial to freedom of the spirit as well as to economic liberty. This
is the basis of the old saying that liberty is indivisible. Since community control over resources is the light that beckons on the left,
the left-to the extent it cares about freedom of the spirit-must
seek out devices that will discipline the government's monopoly in
the realm of ideas. But any such device must consist of an official
arbiter (that is, a government arbiter) to attempt to distribute access to the public forum. And that device cannot be content-neutral. It must decide which views have been heard too much, which
not enough, and which should not be heard at all. The only content-neutral device turns out to be a society in which a significant
portion of the resources are in private hands and beyond the reach
of government altogether.
Redistributive policies generally are quite compatible with this
conception. In fact, as Rawls's theory of justice suggests, 10' this
kind of liberty may be one of the best arguments against gross disparities of income, or at least against serious relative deprivation.
But let the income distribution be as equal as you please, if a large
portion of speech is in private hands, then, on a version of Robert
Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain argument, 05 a lot of those resources
will end up-as a result of private, individual, and independent

,o3 Id at 2101.

See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice §§ 12, 13, 32 (Harvard, 1971).
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick demonstrates how liberty justly upsets patterns of equality, arguing that there is nothing unjust about an end-state distribution of resources that may favor one citizen over another (in this case, Wilt Chamberlain, as
a result of his athletic prowess), at least where the initial distribution of resources was relatively equal and all income transfers occurred through voluntary transactions. See Robert
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 161-64 (Basic, 1974).
104

105 In
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choices-supporting the "wrong" speech, and "worthy" speech
may be heard hardly at all. Once this occurs, the civic republican
arguments we hear today about the corruption of the media and
the degraded state of public discourse would be heard again.
Considering the facts of the American world, the whole drownout thesis is patently absurd. It simply is not the case that no one
will publish unpopular views. Information technology is so far advanced that it takes relatively small capital-capital that almost
anyone can assemble-to put out one's message in print form. One
need only listen to the news and information programming of public broadcasting to hear the broadest array of opinions-with opinions on the left generously represented. If raw, uninterrupted,
uninterpreted public affairs reporting is your thing, it is possible in
most large cities to overdose on twenty-four hours a day of one or
evei two C-SPAN channels. Mini-dish satellite broadcasting will
reach the humblest home in the most rural setting-as it does already in Europe and parts of the Third World. 10 6 So what in the
world are these people talking about? They cannot literally mean
that their messages are drowned out in the sense that those who
wish to hear them cannot. It is not as if the networks or The Wall
Street Journal were actually jamming the broadcasting of anyone's
views. What these people really mean is that not many people are
interested; or are not interested for long; or, like myself, if interested are not at all persuaded. In this respect these critics are like
annoying children who whine at their parents, "you're not listening
to me," when what they mean is, "however much I go on, you don't
think I'm right." This whining is dressed up in the self-serving
jargon of false consciousness, domination, and cultural hegemonism-a jargon picked up from apologists for Marxism-Leninism-all of which is intended to show how the vulgarity of the
competing media is at fault for causing people to ignore the left's
more weighty message. What this comes to, of course, is that what
some on the left have to say is so boring or so unconvincing that
people would rather watch Wheel of Fortune. But is that really
Wheel of Fortune's fault?
In the end the "drown-out" forced-access thesis is really just a
version of fancy arguments that are designed to justify silencing
the opposition. What we have is an argument for censorship-this
time to avoid the competition, in much the spirit that East European television used to jam Western broadcasts of "Dallas." Or it
"I See

generally Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 44-45, 153, 180

(Harvard, 1983).
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is worse: by forcing newspapers to carry articles they do not want
and by forcing networks to carry programming that the public will
not buy, political entrepreneurs are once more flexing their
muscles.
Forced programming is not so much a way of getting a message to the public (the public will probably tune out), as it is a way
of showing off power by hoisting flags on other people's flagpoles.
The West Virginia Board of Education could not have imagined
that by getting Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag' 0 7 they were
instilling patriotism in them. Instead they were showing off their
power by ramming their conception of patriotism down the schoolchildren's throats. This instinct of the civic republican to assert
the primacy of community by ramming beliefs and values down
people's throats is thus the positive version of the negative instinct
to punish those who would speak thoughts the community abhors.
Neither compelled professions of faith nor the punishment of blasphemy really seeks to convince; both seek to assert that great communitarian principle: the primacy of politics.
107 See West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943).

